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 Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Abstract 
A central challenge in defense acquisition is the development of accurate cost and 
schedule estimates.  The lack of discipline in estimating and unrealistic expectations 
in the early phases of programs have been often cited as common causes for poor 
performance of large programs (GAO, 2004, 2006).  Initial estimates provided by 
contractors are known to “anchor” expectations (Aranda & Easterbrook, 2005), even 
when changes in personnel, technology, or budgetary priorities can affect the 
performance of a program.  We examine the use of prediction markets as a tool for 









A central challenge in defense acquisition is the development of accurate cost and 
schedule estimates.  The lack of discipline in estimating and unrealistic expectations in the 
early phases of programs have been often cited as common causes for poor performance of 
large programs (GAO, 2004, 2006).  Initial estimates provided by contractors are known to 
“anchor” expectations (Aranda & Easterbrook, 2005), even when changes in personnel, 
technology, or budgetary priorities can affect the performance of a program.  We examine 
the use of prediction markets as a tool for generating schedule estimates as a supplement 
to existing estimation methodologies.  A prediction market provides an environment for 
traders to buy and sell contracts whose value is tied to an uncertain future event, such as 
the duration of a weapons system acquisition.  Most notably used today for predicting 
election outcomes, prediction markets are used to forecast product sales, movie box office 
returns, terrorist attacks, and sporting events (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). 
A prediction market is a means of forecasting some unknown future condition of the 
world.  In a prediction market, buyers and sellers trade contracts and money for contracts 
whose payoff depends on the future state (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004).   If the market is well 
functioning, contract prices reflect the collective wisdom of the market participants. There 
are three primary types of prediction markets.1 Much of the enthusiasm for prediction 
markets derives from the efficient markets hypothesis.  In a truly efficient prediction market, 
the market price of a prediction market contract will best summarize traders’ beliefs about 
the probability of the event’s occurrence.  Efficient prediction markets should outperform 
available polls and other forecasting mechanisms. 
We anticipate prediction markets to outperform existing defense acquisition 
estimation techniques (i.e., parametric, analogy, activity-based) for cases in which there is 
ample “soft,” relative to “hard,” information, and information is broadly and unevenly held by 
diverse actors.  Examples of such circumstances include one-of-a-kind acquisitions in which 
limited historical information exists, and acquisitions that are prone to performance impacts 
to external events.  Modifications to the design, shifts in program personnel, or changes in 
the political landscape may have significant impacts on the cost and duration of a program.  
Existing cost-estimation techniques are not sensitive to these types of changes because (1) 
most Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) are based on technical factors, rather than 
programmatic “soft” factors; (2) cost estimates are not dynamically updated as a program 
evolves, making the original estimate outdated as soon as the climate changes; and (3) cost 
estimates are a manifestation of a few decision makers, often under tremendous time 
pressure, working with limited and, perhaps biased, information. 
By shifting the paradigm from estimating by individuals to estimating by groups, we 
can harness the wisdom of crowds by capturing their collective intelligence.  A prediction 
market facilitates the aggregation of data from diverse and independent sources, yielding 
more accurate forecasts.  The prediction markets’ value is grounded in several factors.  
First, they provide a way to leverage the wisdom of crowds by aggregating information from 
diverse sources.  Studies have shown that under the right circumstances, prediction markets 
are quite accurate, and often more so than even the most accurate individual forecasters 
(Surowiecki, 2005; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006).  Second, they mitigate decision biases 
stemming from pressures to “price to win” and hide information. Third, they enable frequent 
sampling of information, which makes them more responsive to environmental changes.  
Finally, prediction markets provide incentives for traders to seek out additional information. 
                                                
1 The following discussion of prediction market types comes from Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004). 
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As with any markets, prediction markets may fail—and produce inaccurate 
forecasts—if not properly designed and executed.  Like markets generally, effective 
prediction markets require a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, well informed about 
each other and their resources, and a mechanism through which they can exchange 
resources under fully specified, clear, and enforceable contracts.  We briefly discuss some 
potential challenges in prediction market design before discussing more specific prediction 
market design principles and the conditions for making them successful. 
